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Despite the presence of Medicare, out-of-pocket medical spending is a large expenditure risk facing
the elderly.  While women live longer than men, elderly women incur higher out-of-pocket medical
spending than men at each age.  In this paper, we examine whether differences in marital status and
living arrangements can explain this difference.  We find that out-of-pocket medical spending is approximately
29 percent higher when an individual becomes widowed, a large portion of which is spending on nursing
homes.  Our results suggest a substantial role of living arrangements in out-of-pocket medical spending;
however, our estimates combined with differences in rates of widowhood across gender suggest that
marital status can explain only one third of the gender difference in total out-of-pocket medical spending,
leaving a large portion unexplained.  On the other hand, gender differences in widowhood more than






















1.  Introduction 
 
It is well known that women tend to outlive men.  The average 65-year-old woman has a 
remaining life expectancy of 20.0 years, compared to 17.3 years for the average 65-year-old man 
(Kochanek et al. 2011).  However, despite longer remaining life expectancies, out-of-pocket 
medical spending is higher for women than for men.  Figure 1 depicts total out-of-pocket 
medical spending averaged over five-year age groups for males and females.  The figure shows 
both that average spending is higher for women in each age group and that the difference appears 
to increase at higher ages.   
There are a number of possible explanations for this empirical finding.  For example, 
differences in preferences or insurance coverage can cause out-of-pocket medical spending to 
vary across individuals.  An alternative explanation – which we investigate in this paper – comes 
from the fact that women tend to live longer and marry older men.  Therefore, older women are 
more likely to be widowed.  Widowhood may result in higher out-of-pocket expenses for a 
couple of reasons.  First, widowhood may be accompanied by changes in insurance coverage or 
health status.  A widow’s own health may decline – or she may lose private insurance coverage – 
upon the death of her spouse.  Second, widows are more likely to live alone, and living alone can 
result in higher out-of-pocket medical expenses because a spouse or partner may substitute for 
paid caregivers.  Because rates of private long-term care insurance are low and Medicaid long-
term care eligibility requires one to spend down their resources to qualify, out-of-pocket medical 
spending is particularly vulnerable to the risk of nursing home or home care expenses.  Indeed, 
as shown in Figure 2, there is a large gender difference in spending on nursing homes, 
particularly at higher ages. 3 
 
In this paper, we examine the impact of marital status, and in particular, widowhood, on 
different components of out-of-pocket medical spending and health care utilization.  As there 
may be selection into marriage, we use within-person changes in marital status to identify its 
causal effects.  Because our analysis covers a relatively short time period of 6 years, this method 
allows us to measure the near-term effects of widowhood rather than the long-term effects of 
widowhood.  We find that monthly out-of-pocket medical spending  is $43.06, or about 29 
percent, higher for widows relative to those who are married.  This increase is primarily driven 
by nursing home utilization.  Out-of-pocket nursing home expenditures increase by $24.82 per 
month, accounting for 58 percent of the increase, and the average number of nursing home nights 
over a 2-year period increases by 6.3.  We find that these results are not driven by observable 
changes in health (as measured by self-reported health status, the number of health conditions, 
and limitations in activities of daily living) or sources of insurance, which suggests that living 
arrangements may be the underlying cause of the increase in out-of-pocket expenses.  We also 
find that the effect of marital status on out-of-pocket medical spending does not differ by gender.   
While the effect of widowhood on monthly out-of-pocket medical spending is nontrivial 
and statistically significant, it does not explain a substantial portion of the gender differences in 
overall out-of-pocket medical spending.  Our simulations suggest that differences in marital 
status and living arrangements by gender explain approximately one third of the difference in 
male and female medical spending for individuals age 55 and older, leaving a considerable 
amount due to other factors.  However, accounting for differences in marital status reverses the 
gender differences in out-of-pocket spending on nursing homes, implying that widowhood is an 
important factor in nursing home demand. 4 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and describes 
the contribution of this research.  Section 3 describes our data, Section 4 presents our 
methodology, and Section 5 summarizes our results.  Section 6 details our simulations to 
determine the amount of out-of-pocket medical spending explained by marital status, and Section 
7 offers conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
  There is a large literature on risk factors for nursing home entry.  Recent systematic 
reviews (Luppa et al. 2010; Gaugler et al. 2007; Miller and Weissert 2000) suggest that being 
single is consistently associated with greater probability of nursing home entry.  Other predictors 
that emerge across a number of studies include female gender and living alone, although the 
studies reviewed by Luppa et al. (2010) find inconsistent results for these factors.  These studies 
generally exploit cross-section variation in risk factors to study their effects.  Consistent with 
these findings, Lakdawalla and Philipson (2002) argue that an increase in the elderly population 
can reduce long-term care use because healthy elderly people serve as caregivers to those in poor 
health.  In particular, if growth in the elderly population is accompanied by an increase in the 
ratio of males to females, the number of elderly widows – and thus use of long-term care – falls. 
Their empirical analysis, based on aggregate county-level data, suggests that a decrease in the 
share of elderly men contributed substantially to the observed increase in nursing home care 
during the 1970s.   
A related strand of research concerns the impact of care by family members (informal care) 
on the use of care by professionals (formal care).  In studying this impact, it is important to 
account for the fact that the level of formal and informal care are jointly determined, and that 
unobservable aspects of health status could be correlated with the receipt of both formal and 5 
 
informal care.  Bonsang (2009), Van Houtven and Norton (2004, 2008), Bolin et al. (2007), Lo 
Sasso and Johnson (2002), Charles and Sevak (2005), and Greene (1983) use an instrumental 
variables approach to examine the impact of informal care on the utilization of formal care.  In 
general, these studies find that informal care by children reduces use of formal care, especially 
home care and nursing home stays.  Instruments for informal care in these studies include 
children’s characteristics (e.g., the genders of the children, as daughters are more likely to 
provide care), ethnicity, and proximity of family. Pezzin et al. (1996) find that public 
expenditures on home care reduce informal care provided by family, and Pezzin and Shone 
(1999) find that paid home health care is a substitute for care by children.  In an extension of 
their earlier work, Van Houtven and Norton (2008) further show that care by children 
significantly reduces Medicare long-term care expenses for single parents; however, this effect is 
reduced for married parents.  
  Some earlier studies have examined the relationship between out-of-pocket medical 
spending and the saving behavior among elderly (e.g., DiNardi, French, and Jones 2010; French 
and Jones 2004; Palumbo 1999; Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 1994; Kotlikoff 1988).  While 
marital status is not the main focus of these studies, French and Jones (2004) do find that, after 
controlling for insurance coverage, males have lower costs, while married individuals have 
higher costs.   
  Our work extends this literature in several ways.  First, there is a large literature on the 
impact of widowhood on income and wealth, and some of this literature focuses on the role of 
the out-of-pocket spending of the deceased spouse (see, e.g., McGarry and Schoeni 2005).  
However, we are not aware of other work examining the impact of widowhood on the widow’s 6 
 
own out-of-pocket medical expenses.
1  Second, our work complements the literature on nursing 
home utilization by showing the extent to which increased nursing home utilization among single 
individuals translates into higher monetary costs.  Moreover, to identify the causal effects of 
marital status, we focus on the impact of marital status transitions on out-of-pocket spending.  
Thus, we use within-person, rather than cross-sectional, variation in marital status to identify the 
impact of widowhood on out-of-pocket spending.  It is important to note, however, that an 
analysis based on marital status transitions over a relatively short time period can only measure 
the near-term impact of shocks to marital status.  One might expect the impact of widowhood to 
be different for long-term widows compared to the recently widowed.   
 
3.  Data 
Our data come from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a biennial panel survey that is 
designed to be representative of the population aged 50 and older.  The HRS began with a group 
of non-institutionalized respondents in 1992, but continued to follow them even if they 
subsequently became institutionalized.  Additional respondents were added in later waves to 
keep the sample representative of the target population.  The HRS includes demographic 
information, as well as detailed data on health status, insurance coverage, and health care 
spending and utilization.  We restrict attention to the four waves from 2002-2008, as the 
components of medical spending are reported in a consistent way across these waves.  We also 
restrict attention to individuals aged 55 and older.   
The HRS includes person-level weights, which can be used to make the survey data match 
the characteristics of the non-institutionalized elderly population. Thus, anyone who is in a 
                                                            
1 McGarry and Schoeni (2005) do report the expenditures of the surviving spouse just before and 
after widowhood, but focus mostly on the expenses of the spouse who died. 7 
 
nursing home at the time of interview receives a weight of zero.  Excluding individuals who are 
in a nursing home at the time of interview effectively excludes long-term nursing home 
residents, who are likely to represent a large share of out-of-pocket medical expenses.  Because 
nursing home expenditures are central to our analysis, we report our results without using the 
HRS weights.  However, we also examine the sensitivity of our analysis to excluding nursing 
home residents.   
Most of the variables used in our analysis – including medical care utilization, insurance 
coverage, health status, and demographics – come from the RAND version of the HRS data.   
However, because the RAND dataset includes only total out-of-pocket spending, we must merge 
in data on the components of medical spending from the raw HRS data.  Because of imputations 
and other adjustments that were made by RAND researchers, the components of medical 
spending from the raw data do not necessarily sum to the total from the RAND data.  Thus, we 
create our own measure of total out-of-pocket spending by summing the individual components 
from the raw data. The components of medical spending include spending on hospitals, nursing 
homes, outpatient surgery, doctors, dental, prescription drugs, home health care, and other 
services.  The medical utilization measures include the number of doctor visits, hospital stays, 
hospital nights, and nursing home nights, as well as indictors for whether the respondent had 
doctor visit, hospital stay, home care, prescription drugs, outpatient surgery, dental visit, or other 
medical care use.
2 
In each wave, individuals are asked to report their out-of-pocket medical spending and 
utilization since the last interview.  New respondents are asked about their spending and 
                                                            
2 The “other” category for both spending and utilization generally includes special facilities, such 
as an adult care center, outpatient rehabilitation, transportation or meal services, or a social 
worker. 8 
 
utilization over the previous two years.  For all components of medical spending except 
prescription drugs, respondents are asked about their total spending during the reference period; 
for prescription drugs, respondents are asked to provide the average monthly amount during the 
period.  All of the utilization questions refer to total utilization during the reference period.  If an 
individual was in the previous wave, the average reference period is 24 months, although it 
varies from 13 to 36 months.  We exclude individuals who were not interviewed in the previous 
wave, and are not new interviewees, as the reference period for these individuals could be much 
longer than two years, and some utilization measures cannot easily be adjusted for different 
lengths.  We convert all out-of-pocket spending amounts (except for prescription drugs) to 
average monthly values by dividing by the appropriate reference period.  We also use the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) for medical care to convert all out-of-pocket spending variables 
to 2010 dollars, where the base year for the conversion is the year in which the interview took 
place. 
One shortcoming of our out-of-pocket spending measures is that they do not include 
insurance premiums.  The raw HRS data do contain information about premiums for private 
health insurance, Medicare Advantage, Medicare Part D, and long-term care insurance; however, 
the insurance may cover individuals other than the respondent.  Though the HRS reports if other 
family members are covered, we do not know what fraction of the premium paid is for the other 
family member.  Thus, we cannot compute an individual-level amount for insurance premiums.  
Therefore, our analysis focuses on non-insurance out-of-pocket medical spending. 
Our key independent variable is marital status.  The HRS marital status variable has seven 
categories: (1) married, (2) married - spouse absent, (3) partnered, (4) separated, (5) divorced, (6) 
widowed, and (7) never married.  We define an individual as married if he or she falls into 9 
 
categories (1)-(3).  In certain specifications, we include dummy variables indicating whether an 
individual is covered by Medicare, Medicaid, VA/CHAMPUS, a private insurance plan (which 
includes a plan offered by the respondent’s employer, the spouse’s employer, and any other plan 
besides government or employer-provided), or a long-term care insurance plan.   
We also examine the role of own-health changes, by including measures of the 
respondent’s self-reported health status, health conditions, and difficulties with activities of daily 
living.  In each wave, respondents are asked to report a self-assessment of their health on a scale 
of 1-5, with 1 being excellent and 5 being poor.  The RAND HRS includes an index indicating 
the number of health conditions with which the individual has ever been diagnosed, including 
high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, psychiatric problems, 
and arthritis.  The RAND HRS also includes indices of the number of activities of daily living 
(ADLs) and instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) with which the respondent reports 
“some difficulty.”  The activities included in the ADL index are bathing, dressing, walking 
across a room, getting in or out of bed, and eating.  The activities included in the IADL index are 
using a telephone, taking medication, shopping, preparing meals, and handling money.   
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all variables used in our analysis, measured at the 
person-year level and reported separately by marital status.  Women are more likely to be single 
than men, and the vast majority of single respondents are widowed.  Single respondents also 
report higher out-of-pocket medical spending, particularly for nursing homes.  Figure 3 
summarizes total out-of-pocket spending by marital status, gender and age, and Figure 4 does the 
same for spending on nursing homes.  Figures 3 and 4 suggest that marital status may be able to 
explain some, but not all, of the gender difference in out-of-pocket spending.  Within both 10 
 
genders, single people have higher out-of-pocket spending than married people.  However, 
within the same marital status, women still tend to have higher out-of-pocket expenses than men.   
 
4.  Methods 
Figures 3 and 4 suggest that marital status may play a part in explaining gender differences 
in out-of-pocket spending.  However, these figures are based on cross-sectional variation in 
marital status.  The single group includes those who are recently widowed as well as those who 
have been widowed for many years, and therefore the figures include both the near-term and 
long-term effects of marital status.  Moreover, the single category includes never married and 
divorced individuals, a group that is potentially selected based on unobservable characteristics.  
We conduct our empirical analysis by examining within-person changes in marital status using 
individual fixed effects.  This approach isolates the near-term, causal effects of marital status. 
We begin by estimating regressions of the following form:  
   , (1) 
where  it y  is any of our measures of out-of-pocket spending or utilization, wit is a dummy 
indicating whether individual i is widowed in year t, dit is a dummy indicating whether 
individual i is divorced in year t,  sit is a dummy indicating whether individual i is single 
(never married) in year t,ait is a vector of age dummies for individual i in year t,  i   is an 
individual fixed effect,  t   is a year (wave) effect, and  it   is a stochastic error term.  The α’s 
measure the impact of being widowed, divorced, or single relative to the reference category of 
married.  We estimate (1) for each of our spending and utilization measures. 
When an individual transitions from being married to single or vice versa, his or her health 
insurance coverage may change.  While insurance directly lowers out-of-pocket spending, the 
y it   1w it   2d it   3s it   a it   i   t   it11 
 
overall impact on out-of-pocket medical spending could be positive or negative because of 
increased utilization due to moral hazard.  In addition, an individual’s own health condition may 
also change upon becoming widowed, divorced, or married.  Therefore, we add to (1) controls 
describing each individual’s health and insurance status as described in the previous section.  We 
allow for full nonlinearity by including each set of variables as indicator variables.  If controlling 
for health and insurance status substantially reduces the magnitude of the estimated α’s, it would 
suggest that changes in out-of-pocket medical spending that occur with changes in marital status 
are driven by changes in insurance or health status.  Finally, we test whether women are more 
vulnerable than men to the effect of marital status by estimating (1) with the marital status 
dummies interacted with gender.   
We also conduct a series of sensitivity analyses and robustness checks.  Because our 
definition of married includes a small number of respondents who report their spouses being 
absent (largely because either they or their spouses are in nursing homes), we include a separate 
dummy for whether the individual’s spouse is in a nursing home.  We also estimate (1) only for 
individuals with no children in order to determine whether having no children makes individuals 
more vulnerable to the effects of widowhood.  In addition, we estimate (1) for individuals who 
fall within the 5
th – 95
th percentile of out-of-pocket spending for their 5-year age group.  This 
illustrates the extent to which our findings are driven by outliers.  Finally, we estimate (1) only 
for households where neither spouse is in a nursing home at the time of interview.  As discussed 
earlier, this restriction effectively excludes long-term nursing home residents and illustrates the 
extent to which spending by this group drives our results.  In all of our regressions, standard 
errors are clustered by household in order to account for the fact that individuals from the same 
household may have correlated shocks to out-of-pocket spending or utilization. 12 
 
 
5.  Results 
Table 2 summarizes the results from estimating (1) on total out-of-pocket medical 
spending and its components.  The results indicate that being widowed is associated with $43.06 
in additional monthly out-of-pocket medical spending relative to being married.  This amount 
represents a 29 percent increase in the average monthly out-of-pocket medical spending for 
married respondents and is statistically significant at conventional levels, though the coefficient 
has a large standard error.  The main driver of this increased spending is spending on nursing 
home care:  individuals spend on average $24.82 monthly in additional out-of-pocket nursing 
home care when widowed relative to $2.98 spent on average while married.  Because the 
regressions include individual fixed effects, these estimates are identified off of changes in 
marital status within individuals over time.  Age and year fixed effects capture differences in out-
of-pocket spending common to all individuals of a particular age and time trends common to all 
respondents. 
With the exception of out-of-pocket dental spending, the remaining categories of out-of-
pocket spending show no statistically significant relationship of widowhood.  In addition, we 
find no evidence that being separated/divorced or never married is associated with higher out-of-
pocket medical spending overall, though both of these groups experience higher levels of nursing 
home spending relative to married individuals. 
Given that our analysis focuses on out-of-pocket medical spending and not overall health 
spending, if individuals have generous insurance coverage, health care utilization may change 
with marital status without changing out-of-pocket medical spending.  Table 3 summarizes the 
results of estimating (1) using various measures of health care utilization as the dependent 13 
 
variable.  Columns (1) through (8) show the effect of marital status on extensive measures of 
health care utilization which measure whether the respondent utilized different types of care over 
the appropriate reference period.  Widowhood is associated with higher rates of outpatient 
surgery, nursing home stays, home health care, and use of special health facilities.  The 
coefficients are large in magnitude:  the probability of reporting a nursing home stay increases by 
over 70 percent.  Separation or divorce is associated with higher rates of outpatient surgery and 
nursing home stays, while never married respondents do not exhibit health care utilization 
different from those who are married.  Table 3 also shows the results of estimating (1) using 
intensive measures of health care utilization in columns (9) through (12).  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, all respondents spend significantly more nights in nursing homes when 
unmarried relative to when they are married.  However, the results show no evidence that the 
number of hospital stays, doctor visits and hospital nights change with changes in marital status.   
We next examine whether the effects of marital status on out-of-pocket medical spending 
alter when we control for health status and health insurance, which may also change when 
marital status changes.  These results are reported in Table 4.  The estimated coefficients on 
widowhood are smaller in magnitude but change only slightly after the additional controls are 
incorporated, suggesting that very little of the effects of widowhood on out-of-pocket medical 
spending are due to worsened health status or poorer insurance.  A spouse often substitutes for 
paid caregivers; in the absence of this form of insurance, individuals often find themselves 
needing nursing home care.  This effect is likely due to the fact that insurance against long-term 
care risk is often inadequate:  only 12 percent of our sample owns private long-term care 
insurance and Medicare does not cover extended use of long-term care, leaving many to spend 
down their resources until eligible for long-term care services through Medicaid. 14 
 
Finally, we analyze whether females are more vulnerable to widowhood than their male 
counterparts by estimating interacted versions of (1) which allow us to determine whether the 
effects we estimate differ across gender.  Table 5 reports our findings.  For all components of 
out-of-pocket medical spending, the coefficient on the marital status X gender interaction terms 
are statistically insignificant, suggesting there is no evidence of a gender difference in the effect 
of marital status on out-of-pocket medical spending.  The main effects of marital status are less 
precisely estimated, though the magnitudes are very similar to those we report in Table 2. 
Table 6 reports the results of four different sensitivity and robustness checks.  We report 
the results for total out-of-pocket medical spending and that spent on nursing homes, but omit the 
other components of out-of-pocket spending for simplicity.  Columns (1) and (2) report the 
results of including an additional control variable indicating whether one’s spouse is in a nursing 
home.  Having a spouse in a nursing home is highly correlated with being in a nursing home 
oneself; thus, it is not surprising to find a large, positive coefficient on this variable in the 
nursing home expenditures regression.  Columns (3) and (4) report the results of estimating 
equation (1) for individuals with no children.  None of the marital status coefficients are 
statistically significant, providing no evidence that individuals without children are more 
vulnerable to the effects of widowhood.  We note, however, that the number of individuals with 
no children is small.  Columns (5) and (6) report the results of estimating equation (1) for 
individuals who fall into the 5
th through 95
th percentile of out-of-pocket spending for their age 
group.  Now widowhood no longer has a statistically significant impact on total out-of-pocket 
spending, and it has a much smaller (statistically significant) impact on nursing home spending.  
These results suggest that most of the effects of widowhood are concentrated among a small 
group in the form of catastrophic medical spending.  Finally, columns (7) and (8) report the 15 
 
results from estimating equation (1) on individuals who are not in a nursing home at the time of 
interview.  Now widowhood no longer has a statistically significant impact on out-of-pocket 
spending, suggesting that long-term nursing home stays play a large role in our results.  
 
6.  Simulation Exercise 
While our results suggest that marital status has a nontrivial effect on out-of-pocket 
medical spending, our analysis thus far does not indicate whether the effect we estimate can 
explain the gender differences in out-of-pocket medical spending depicted in Figure 1.  
Therefore, we use our results to conduct a simulation to determine what portion of the gender 
difference in out-of-pocket medical spending is accounted for by differences in marital status 
across gender. 
We define:  














,         
 
where  g a N ,  is the number of person-year observations of gender g and age group a, and  i ˆ  is 
the estimated individual fixed effect from (1).  In other words,  g a z ,  is the mean of the estimated 
individual fixed effects from specification (1) for age group a and gender g, calculated across all 
person-year observations in age group a and gender g.  The difference  men a women a z z , ,   is the 
gender difference in unexplained out-of-pocket spending after accounting for marital status 
differences in out-of-pocket spending and differences in marital status across gender.   
  We then estimate an alternative specification 
         ,      ( 2 )   it t it i it a y ' ' ' '        16 
 
which is the same as (1) but does not include the marital status dummies.  We define  g a z , '  
analogously for specification (2) for each age group a and gender g.   The difference 
men a women a z z , , ' '  is the gender difference in unexplained out-of-pocket spending without 
controlling for marital status.  Finally, we compute the following measure for each age group a: 
           men a women a










    ( 3 )
 
The value  a  represents the share of the gender difference in out-of-pocket spending of age 
group a that is explained by marital status.   
  Table 7 reports  men a women a z z , ,   for both specifications (1) and (2), as well as  a  for each of 
the 5-year age groups included in Figure 1 and for the sample overall.  Panel (a) reports the 
results for total out-of-pocket medical spending, and (b) restricts to out-of-pocket spending on 
nursing homes.  These results suggest that across age groups, marital status can explain about 35 
percent of the raw gender difference in total out-of-pocket spending.  Marital status tends to 
explain a larger percentage of the gender difference for older age groups. While the effect of 
marital status is nontrivial, it still leaves a large fraction of the gender difference in out-of-pocket 
spending unexplained. 
  Panel (b) suggests that accounting for differences in marital status across gender reverses 
the relationship of out-of-pocket spending on nursing homes between men and women.  When 
controls for marital status are not included, average out-of-pocket nursing home spending is 
higher for women.  However, with the addition of marital status controls, men have higher levels 
of unexplained out-of-pocket spending on nursing homes.  Therefore, accounting for marital 
status differences explains more than the entire gender difference in out-of-pocket spending on 
nursing homes.   17 
 
  
7.  Conclusions 
Despite the presence of near-universal insurance by Medicare, out-of-pocket medical 
spending constitutes a large expenditure risk facing the elderly.  One of the largest components 
of this risk is spending on nursing home care because private insurance coverage for long-term 
care expenses is low and eligibility for Medicaid coverage of long-term care requires an almost 
complete spend-down of financial resources.   
In this paper, we show that living with one’s spouse appears to at least partially proxy for 
paid caregivers, as nursing home costs increase substantially with widowhood, even after 
controlling for changes in health and insurance status.  The increased nursing home costs 
generate an increase in total out-of-pocket medical spending of approximately 29 percent for 
widowed elderly relative to married elderly.  By including individual fixed effects, our analysis 
uses marital status changes, rather than long-standing differences in marital status, to identify the 
near-term, causal effects of marital status. 
While the effect we find is fairly substantial, increase out-of-pocket spending by widows 
and the higher number of widows who are women cannot account for the majority of the gender 
difference in total out-of-pocket medical spending by the elderly.  Though we find that living 
arrangements can explain more than the raw gender difference in nursing home spending, our 
simulations suggest that living arrangements account for approximately 35 percent of the 
difference in total out-of-pocket medical spending.  The remainder could be due to a variety of 
additional factors, such as gender differences in health status, health care utilization conditional 
on health status, or insurance generosity.  Examining the drivers of the gender differences 
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Figure 1:  Monthly Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending by Age and Gender (Total) 
 
Source:  Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Waves 5-9, 2002-2008. 
Note:  All figures in 2010 dollars.   
 
Figure 2:  Monthly Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending by Age and Gender (Nursing Home) 
 
Source:  Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Waves 5-9, 2002-2008. 



































































































Figure 3:  Monthly Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending by Age, Gender and Marital Status (Total) 
 
Source:  Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Waves 5-9, 2002-2008. 
Note:  All figures in 2010 dollars.   
 
Figure 4:  Monthly Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending by Age, Gender and Marital Status 
(Nursing Home) 
 
Source:  Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Waves 5-9, 2002-2008. 
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55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90+
5-Year Age Group
Married Males Single Males
Married Females Single Females22 
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Widowed 0.622 0.485 0 1 0 0 0 0
Separated/divorced 0.296 0.456 0 1 0 0 0 0
Never married 0.081 0.273 0 1 0 0 0 0
Age 72.91 10.38 55 109 67.95 8.33 55 102
Female 0.758 0.428 0 1 0.473 0.499 0 1
Race
   White 0.761 0.426 0 1 0.865 0.342 0 1
   Black 0.195 0.397 0 1 0.096 0.295 0 1
   Other 0.043 0.203 0 1 0.039 0.193 0 1
Hispanic 0.086 0.281 0 1 0.081 0.273 0 1
Education
   Less than High School 0.293 0.455 0 1 0.197 0.398 0 1
   GED 0.041 0.198 0 1 0.046 0.208 0 1
   High School Graduate 0.323 0.468 0 1 0.314 0.464 0 1
   Some College 0.198 0.399 0 1 0.214 0.410 0 1
   College + 0.144 0.351 0 1 0.230 0.421 0 1
Monthly Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending (in 2010 dollars)
   Total 162.55 693.80 0 32,684 148.03 730.25 0 94,215
   Hospital 9.01 107.45 0 11,933 12.25 487.48 0 93,441
   Doctor 11.64 43.47 0 1,388 16.13 64.19 0 5,671
   Outpatient Surgery 3.12 60.91 0 7,893 4.10 34.15 0 2,180
   Prescription Drugs 92.54 600.88 0 32,642 84.81 514.97 0 68,004
   Dental 21.15 64.47 0 1,735 26.66 69.17 0 2,855
   Nursing Home 21.99 273.49 0 18,309 2.98 74.58 0 4,575
   Home Care 2.26 60.16 0 4,096 0.55 22.14 0 2,205
   Other 0.84 20.10 0 1,805 0.55 11.20 0 963
Prob (Health Care Utilization over Previous 2 Years)
   Hospital Stay 0.302 0.459 0 1 0.245 0.430 0 1
   Doctor Visit 0.942 0.234 0 1 0.949 0.220 0 1
   Outpatient Surgery 0.200 0.400 0 1 0.217 0.412 0 1
   Dental Visit 0.848 0.359 0 1 0.827 0.379 0 1
   Regularly Take Rx 0.524 0.499 0 1 0.667 0.471 0 1
   Nursing Home Stay 0.061 0.240 0 1 0.018 0.131 0 1
   Home Health Care 0.109 0.312 0 1 0.055 0.229 0 1
   Special Health Facility 0.110 0.312 0 1 0.071 0.257 0 1
Degree of Health Care Utilization over Previous 2 Years
   Number of Hospital Stays 0.534 1.211 0 50 0.405 1.057 0 60
   Number of Doctor Visits 11.090 17.410 0 609 10.082 18.710 0 900
   Nights in Hospital 2.945 11.508 0 614 1.918 7.727 0 320
   Nights in Nursing Home 12.420 81.709 0 1,005 1.649 26.544 0 945
Insurance Coverage
   Medicare 0.774 0.418 0 1 0.629 0.483 0 1
   Medicaid 0.147 0.354 0 1 0.041 0.198 0 1
   Champus/VA 0.043 0.203 0 1 0.065 0.246 0 1
   Private Plan 0.536 0.499 0 1 0.697 0.459 0 1
   Long-Term Care Insurance 0.099 0.298 0 1 0.139 0.346 0 1
Fair/Poor Health Status 0.328 0.469 0 1 0.430 0.495 0 1
Number of Health Conditions 2.356 1.477 0 8 1.997 1.390 0 8
Number of ADLs 0.512 1.123 0 5 0.239 0.769 0 5
Number of IADLs 0.491 1.143 0 5 0.205 0.726 0 5
Spouse in Nursing Home 0.000 0.000 0 0 0.009 0.093 0 1
Notes:  Observations at the person-year level.  Sample excludes individuals under age 55.
Source:  Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Waves 6-9, 2002-2008.
Married/partnered
N = 38,240 N = 20,407
Single23 
 
Table 2:  Effect of Marital Status on Monthly Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)












Widowed 43.06** 0.0717 -0.617 3.303 10.52 4.158** 24.82** 0.971 -0.164
(17.29) (1.868) (1.133) (3.856) (12.84) (1.661) (10.32) (1.441) (0.430)
Separated/divorced -8.916 -1.196 -1.389 1.900 -27.30 1.487 17.69*** -0.783 0.670
(26.95) (4.757) (1.794) (2.176) (24.88) (2.138) (6.322) (1.932) (0.524)
Never married 26.98 -1.582 2.431 4.737 -0.646 1.425 20.39*** 0.0929 0.136
(17.04) (3.016) (3.233) (2.905) (13.66) (2.848) (7.035) (1.110) (0.275)
Observations 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647
R-squared 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.025 0.017 0.004
Number of individuals 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944
Dependent Variable Mean:
   Married 148.03 12.25 16.13 4.1 84.81 26.66 2.98 0.55 0.55
   Married and Nonzero 164.03 136.69 28.51 47.27 122.71 46.42 567.76 79.91 26.17
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  Dependent variable as indicated in 2010 dollars.  All specifications include age, year, and individual fixed effects.  Regressions are 
unweighted.  Standard errors clustered by household.24 
 
Table 3:  Effect of Marital Status on Prob (Health Care Utilization) and Degree of Health Care Utilization Over Previous 2 Years

















Widowed 0.00654 0.00320 0.0198* -0.0106 0.00820 0.0127** 0.0180** 0.0162*
(0.0127) (0.00603) (0.0119) (0.00738) (0.0106) (0.00599) (0.00803) (0.00842)
Separated/divorced -0.00638 0.00522 0.0360** 0.00711 0.0176 0.0208*** 0.0155 0.0152
(0.0186) (0.00952) (0.0174) (0.0123) (0.0154) (0.00789) (0.00994) (0.0116)
Never married -0.0655 -0.00376 -0.0192 -0.0366 0.0151 0.0302 0.0209 0.000259
(0.0453) (0.0300) (0.0334) (0.0353) (0.0382) (0.0215) (0.0308) (0.0245)
Observations 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647
R-squared 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.026 0.003 0.034 0.018 0.007
Number of individuals 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944
Dependent Variable Mean:
   Married 0.245 0.949 0.217 0.827 0.667 0.018 0.055 0.071













Widowed 0.0161 -0.0643 0.298 6.293***
(0.0294) (0.426) (0.217) (1.756)
Separated/divorced 0.0168 -0.237 -0.0564 4.310**
(0.0511) (0.465) (0.312) (1.982)
Never married -0.204 0.803 -0.697 21.15*
(0.127) (1.122) (0.514) (11.68)
Observations 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647
R-squared 0.010 0.006 0.005 0.038
Number of individuals 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944
Dependent Variable Mean:
   Married 0.405 10.082 1.918 1.649
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  Dependent variable as indicated.  All specifications include age, year, and individual fixed effects.  Regressions are unweighted.  Standard 
errors clustered by household.
Prob (Health Care Utilization) Over Previous 2 Years
Degree of Health Care Utilization




Table 4:  Effect of Marital Status on Monthly Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending:  Health Status and Insurance Controls
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )( 9 )












Widowed 41.56** -0.136 -0.350 3.421 11.68 4.172** 22.14** 0.815 -0.179
(16.82) (2.042) (1.131) (3.882) (12.86) (1.661) (9.561) (1.450) (0.429)
Separated/divorced -12.75 -1.460 -1.238 1.983 -26.72 1.623 13.47** -1.048 0.644
(26.63) (4.772) (1.770) (2.174) (24.74) (2.132) (5.760) (1.938) (0.517)
Never married 22.41 0.101 3.038 4.985* -1.005 1.241 14.23* -0.192 0.0115
(18.04) (4.088) (3.234) (2.932) (13.92) (2.866) (7.511) (1.315) (0.298)
Observations 58647 58647 58647 58647 58647 58647 58647 58647 58647
R-squared 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.059 0.021 0.006
Number of individuals 19944 19944 19944 19944 19944 19944 19944 19944 19944
Dependent Variable Mean:
   Married 148.03 12.25 16.13 4.1 84.81 26.66 2.98 0.55 0.55
   Married and Nonzero 164.03 136.69 28.51 47.27 122.71 46.42 567.76 79.91 26.17
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  Dependent variable as indicated in 2010 dollars.  All specifications include age, year, and individual fixed effects.  Regressions are unweighted.  
Health status and insurance controls include self-reported health status indicator variables, indicator variables for number of ADLs and IADLs, and 
indicator variables for the number of health conditions ever had.  See text for more details.  Standard errors clustered by household.26 
 
Table 5:  Effect of Marital Status on Monthly Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending:  Interaction with Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)












Widowed 31.32 -0.943 -2.415 -0.929 10.28 0.494 19.96 4.652 0.216
(24.19) (3.862) (2.389) (1.092) (18.85) (2.674) (12.47) (4.886) (0.547)
Widowed X Female 17.66 1.248 2.665 6.052 1.407 5.562* 6.378 -5.200 -0.452
(32.56) (4.588) (2.712) (5.682) (24.36) (3.371) (18.39) (4.904) (0.777)
Divorced -0.587 -6.920 -4.346 1.010 -3.242 0.433 15.86 -3.622 0.239
(17.49) (6.765) (3.214) (1.832) (8.355) (2.671) (10.16) (5.149) (0.217)
Divorced X Female -12.13 8.868 4.999 1.898 -37.37 2.305 2.601 3.900 0.669
(44.30) (9.139) (3.879) (4.131) (39.31) (4.105) (13.29) (5.244) (0.841)
Never married 7.467 -3.481 -1.153 3.604 1.414 -3.089 10.99* -0.882 0.0669
(20.38) (3.590) (2.029) (3.294) (18.46) (4.322) (5.922) (2.196) (0.209)
Never married X Female 32.46 3.843 5.551 2.412 -0.347 6.784 13.39 0.810 0.0196
(31.61) (5.790) (4.961) (5.668) (26.65) (5.700) (12.26) (2.397) (0.488)
Observations 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647 58,647
R-squared 0.006 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.028 0.030 0.005
Number of individuals 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944 19,944
Dependent Variable Mean:
   Married 148.03 12.25 16.13 4.1 84.81 26.66 2.98 0.55 0.55
   Married and Nonzero 164.03 136.69 28.51 47.27 122.71 46.42 567.76 79.91 26.17
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  Dependent variable as indicated in 2010 dollars.  All specifications include age, year, and individual fixed effects.  Regressions are 
unweighted.  Standard errors clustered by household.27 
 
Table 6:  Effect of Marital Status on Monthly Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending:  Sensitivity and Robustness Checks













Widowed 38.62** 26.87*** 36.78 6.293 -1.364 -3.684** 20.06 1.966
(18.04) (10.41) (83.98) (21.35) (5.448) (1.606) (14.60) (2.060)
Separated/divorced -11.03 18.67*** -4.666 -2.793 -1.131 2.113 -25.29 2.021
(27.01) (6.355) (66.54) (15.96) (5.882) (2.510) (26.80) (2.757)
Never married 23.31 22.08*** 47.69 4.037 -15.64 -2.574 7.985 1.387
(17.06) (7.120) (64.83) (17.35) (15.21) (1.774) (15.86) (1.480)
Spouse in NH -111.6 51.44**
(138.6) (22.59)
Sample
Observations 58,647 58,647 3,680 3,680 50,015 50,015 57,718 57,718
R-squared 0.005 0.025 0.136 0.433 0.023 0.032 0.005 0.007
Number of individuals 19,944 19,944 1,395 1,395 18,631 18,631 19,687 19,687
Dependent Variable Mean:
   Married 148.03 2.98 151.5 6.13 106.81 1.05 145.97 0.78
   Married and Nonzero 164.03 567.76 167.37 526.61 108.92 261.56 161.59 262.17
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes:  Dependent variable as indicated in 2010 dollars.  All specifications include age, year, and individual fixed effects.  Regressions 
are unweighted.  Standard errors clustered by household.
Full Sample No Children






Table 7:  Percent of Differences in Monthly Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending by Gender 
Explained by Differences in Marital Status by Gender 
 








Notes:  Specification 1 includes age, year, and individual fixed effects.  Specification 2 includes 









55-59 $22.14 $19.31 12.8%
60-64 $29.67 $25.22 15.0%
65-69 $13.51 $6.32 53.2%
70-74 $12.59 $3.16 74.9%
75-79 $8.97 -$3.08 134.3%
80-84 $39.58 $23.37 40.9%
85-89 $8.00 -$9.21 215.1%
90+ $49.64 $31.48 36.6%













55-59 $0.34 -$2.55 841.0%
60-64 -$0.39 -$4.19 -968.7%
65-69 -$0.89 -$6.22 -600.9%
70-74 $4.01 -$2.66 166.4%
75-79 $7.51 -$0.14 101.9%
80-84 $16.84 $7.02 58.3%
85-89 $19.52 $9.41 51.8%
90+ $29.73 $19.08 35.8%
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